the mesh, explained

/mesh

The two data centres behave like one machine because of a single, deliberate piece of engineering: an encrypted WireGuard tunnel. This page explains how it works — properly, but in plain language. Tunnel addresses shown are illustrative.

SRV01 Coventry SRV02 Maidenhead wg0 · ChaCha20-Poly1305
checking…
last check

Two machines, one private network

The two servers sit in different data centres, 100 miles apart, each with its own connection to the internet. WireGuard gives them a second, private network layered on top: each server gets a tunnel address on a network that exists nowhere else in the world. Addresses on this page are illustrative — call them 10.0.0.1 (Coventry) and 10.0.0.2 (Maidenhead).

interface: wg0
  address: 10.0.0.1  # coventry
  peer:    10.0.0.2  # maidenhead

Identity by cryptography, not passwords

Each server holds a private key that never leaves the machine, and knows the other’s public key. A peer is its keypair: if a packet isn’t sealed by the expected private key, it does not exist as far as WireGuard is concerned — there is no login prompt to attack, no password to guess. To the rest of the internet the tunnel port is silent; unsolicited probes get no reply at all.

peer: srv02
  public key: (pinned)
  allowed ips: 10.0.0.2/32

The handshake

Roughly every two minutes the peers perform a fresh cryptographic handshake and derive brand-new session keys. This gives the tunnel forward secrecy: even if a key were somehow compromised in the future, previously recorded traffic could not be decrypted. A recent handshake is also the health signal — it means the artery is alive right now.

srv01 session key a7f3…9c1 re-key ~2 min srv02 session key b2e8…4d7
$ wg show wg0 latest-handshakes
peer srv02 · handshake 47s ago · ok

Everything inside is ChaCha20

Every packet crossing between the sites is encrypted with ChaCha20-Poly1305 — modern authenticated encryption that both scrambles the data and proves it wasn\u2019t tampered with in transit. The public internet carries the packets, but sees only opaque ciphertext between two endpoints.

backup ▓▓░▓▓░▓ public internet sees this srv01
transport: chacha20-poly1305
visible to the internet: ciphertext only

What actually rides the mesh

Three kinds of traffic, and only these: the nightly backup pull (Maidenhead reaches across and takes an encrypted copy of the primary), the uptime probes (Maidenhead checks the primary\u2019s health every minute — including the mesh itself), and administration. Management interfaces bind to the tunnel and loopback only; they are simply not present on the public internet.

SRV02 → SRV01restic backup pull · nightly
SRV02 → SRV01health probes · every 60s
tunnel + loopbackadmin interfaces only · never public

Watch it breathe

The mesh isn\u2019t a diagram, it\u2019s a live thing — the monitoring site pings the primary through the tunnel every minute, and that reading is published. The WireGuard Mesh row on the status page is that probe, in real time.

connecting to the probe…
probe: srv02 -> tunnel -> srv01
published: status page · live